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Since the days of Sh ils and Geertz it has been common to refer 
to ethn icity as a bond , a t ie ,  or an attachment. Shi ls used the term "t ie" 
in the title of h is seminal 1 957 article to refer to a set of social relationsh ips ,  
includ ing what he called "civil , " "k insh ip , "  "sacred , "  and "primord ial. " The 
pr imord ial t ie was notable for the " i neffable s ign ificance" which social 
actors attribute to it and to the relat ionship which it engenders :  "the 
attachment [ is] not merely to the other  . . .  as a person ,  but as a possessor  
of  certain especially 's ign ificant relat ional' qual it ies, wh ich could only be 
described as p rimord ial. The attachment . . .  is not  just a funct ion of 
i nteract ion . "1 Subsequently Geertz developed the notion of ethn ic  
"attachment" as an affect and identity, or better yet , an affect-centered 
identity. The i ntent ion , often qu ite explicit , of these th inkers and the 
many who followed them was to emphasize the emotional quality of 
eth n icity as an explanation of its persistence and power. At the same 
t ime ,  as an emotional and not rat ional phenomenon ,  ethn icity was 
expected to decli ne  and d isappear under  the onslaught of modern 
rat ionaliz ing social forces.  
Th is  essay retu rns to the issue of ethn ic ity as an affective 
relat ionsh ip .  It will argue that affect is indeed a critical element i n  ethn icity 
but that the theoretical t reatment of eth n ic  affect has tended to be 
counterproductive . S imply put ,  the appeal to ethn ic "bonds , "  "t ies , "  or  
"attachments" has i nh ibited the analys is of  ethn ic attachment because 
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the terms are unarticulated and purportedly in no need of articulat ion .  
The unexamined use of affect or the use of unexamined affect as the 
base of eth n ic ity has led to the overest i mat ion  of its i r rat ional ity, 
underestimation of its variabi l ity, and d isregard of its social construct ion. 
Therefore, I will sketch a model of ethn ic attachment as affect 
but as comprehensible affect . F i rst, I will demonstrate that ethn icity is  
characte rized by an emotional attachment. I will then show how the 
apparent i neffabil ity of ethn ic attachment has misled us. F inally, I will 
i llustrate how conceptually-examined and socially-constructed affect can 
be brought to ethn ic ity by i ntroducing two theories of attachment from 
psychology - - Bowlby's attachment theory and Tajfel's social identification 
theo ry - - and explori ng i n  a preliminary way their  implicat ions for a social 
theory of ethn icity. This will contri bute to the "psycho-cultural  app roach 
to social belong ing"2 upon which a complete understand ing of ethn icity 
depends . 
Ethnicity as Affect 
Most -- but not all -- theorists seem to ag ree that ethn ic ity is 
essentially or  largely a "sentiment , "  "feeli ng , "  or emot ion:  "ethn ic ity is 
felf. "3 From th is perspective ethn ic ity is the feel ing of bei ng "attached" 
to some g roup and/or  its symbols or " markers . "  I ndividuals experience 
a certai n attendant affect which makes the g roup and its marke rs 
important to their  own sense of identity, i nterest , and desti ny. 
What holds the ind ividual to the ethn ic markers and what makes 
of h im  or her an ethnic member and makes of the group an ethn ic  g roup 
is an emotional attachment. It is th is emotional attachment, most theorists 
ag ree, which renders the markers and the g roup personally s ign if icant 
and wh ich g ives eth n ic ity its d ist i nctive power, pervas iveness ,  and 
pers istence (and i n  many eyes perniciousness) . I ndiv iduals are deeply 
emotionally i nvolved with or committed to the markers of the i r  g roup and 
to other  members of the g roup,  and ind ividual identity and action are 
accord ingly based on th is affective connection to g roup and symbol. 
H oweve r, t h i s  be i n g  sa id , eth n ic i ty theory has ofte n not  
scrut in ized th is  fundamental bridging concept which nevertheless is called 
upon to do such crit ical duty in the explanatory process.  What is th is 
emot ion l ike? How is the emotional attachment formed? These are 
questions which are not adequately asked . I n  fact , i n  many formulations 
they are quest ions which do not need to be asked beyond the two 
assumptions that it carries a h igh -- an invariantly h igh -- "emotional 
load ing "4 for all ind ividuals i n  all g roups and that it is essentially p rimal, 
natural, unconstructed and not a function of interaction,  that is, pr imordial. 
I t  is well to remember, g iven that the subject of th is volume is 
" Ethn icity: Fami ly and Community, " in looking for an analogy of ethn ic 
attachment with the qual ities of strong,  natural , and primal feeling ,  a 
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number of theorists have settled upon kinship .  Geertz identified a relation 
between family t ies and ethn ic "p rimord ial sent iments , "  the latte r aris ing 
natu rally from the "g ivens . . .  of  social existence: immediate cont igu ity and 
kin connections mainly" but  also commun ity and g roup social facts .5 
Subsequent theorists have been more forceful :  one writes that the 
"language of ethn icity is the language of kinsh ip , "6 wh ile another  asserts 
that ethn icity and race are "extensions of the id iom of kinsh ip ,  and . . .  ethn ic 
and race sentiments are to be understood as an extended and attentuated 
form of kin selection . "?  I n  the k inship model of ethn icity ki nsh ip is natu ral , 
apriori, and ineffable emotion in need of no other explanation than its 
existence . And si nce many eth n ic g roups and members stake the i r  
ethn ic ity on id ioms of b i rth ,  descent, and g roup h isto ry -- the same 
markers upon which kinship is staked -- the theorists are often led to 
conclude that ethnic ity too is a natu ral , apriori, i neffable emotion .  In  
other words,  easily (but  not necessarily) th is appeal to the ki nsh ip id iom 
can lead theorists back aga in to primord ialism (o r the most extreme 
"natu ralist" theory -- sociobiology) in a closed c i rcle of log ic .  
For many ethn icity theorists , the centrality of  emotion positively 
demands a p rimord ialist read ing .  The very value of pr imord ial ism is its 
focus on "the g reat emotional strength" of ethn ic attachment.s I n  fact, 
some theorists have thought that p rimord ial ism is a necessary way if not 
the only way to incorporate emotions into ethn icity theory. For Stack 
without pr imord ial ism "the complexity, res i l ience, and even i rrat ionality 
of ethn ic bonds are li kely to be underestimated , " g  while Scott believes 
that "we need the pr imord ial approach fo r a complete explanatio n , "  
especially o f  ethn ic ity's "most extreme, strident, i rrat ional aspects . " 1 0 
For such theorists the only way they can understand "extreme , "  "strident , "  
"complex , "  and  " i rrational" sentiments and behaviors - - or  ones that seem 
so to them -- is by bas ing them on emotion construed to be apriori and in 
the blood , i neffable , ancient, unconstructed ,  and therefore beyond the 
pale of the modern wo rld 's  more " rat io nal" and restra i ned soc ial 
organization .  
I n  the  end i t  seems that although emotion and attachment are 
invoked as crit ical to the natu re (and explanation) of ethn ic ity i n  most 
cases,  they are not developed as serious analyt ical tools ; rather, they 
are taken as a sort of theoret ical "f i rst cause , "  at once overemphasized 
a n d  u n d e rt h e o r i ze d  a n d  ove re m p h as i ze d  beca use t h e y  a re 
u n d e rtheo rized . What we need is an elaborat ion of the not io n  of 
attach ment ,  how attachments fo rm, feel , and fu nction .  Th is  would 
necessa rily e nta i l  a soc ia l  psycholog ical perspect ive.  Toward th i s  
objective I now i ntroduce two models o f  attachment which may have 
important implications and raise important possibilities for ethn icity theory. 
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Attachment Theory 
Attachment theory has spawned both s ign ificant l iterature and 
s ign if icant expe rimental f ind i ngs i n  psychology si nce its formu lat ion by 
John Bowlby over th irty years ago. Although its orig inal empi rical interests 
(to exp la in  a set of observations regard ing the emotional behavior  of 
institutional ized or otherwise parent-deprived ch i ldren) and its theoretical 
i ntent ions (to refo rmulate an a rea of psychoanalytic theory without 
refe rence to inst i ncts , d rives,  g ratif icat ion ,  or psychic energy) are far 
from the realm of ethn icity, it has developed concepts and understandings 
which may be helpful  i n  comprehend ing ethn ic affect . 
I n  Bowlby's words, "attachment theory is a way of conceptual iz ing 
the p ropens ity of human beings to make strong affect ional bonds to 
particu lar others . " 1 1  Lite ral ly from the f i rst months of l ife a human shows 
a p reference for certa in other ind iv iduals ,  i n it ia l ly and especial ly the 
mothe r. However Bowlby f inds the class ical psychoanalytic explanations 
for such phenomena, which emphasize need g rat ificat ion and tens ion 
reduct ion ,  unsat isfactory. For one th ing he observed that i nfants and 
ch i l d ren who had the i r  re lationsh ip with s ign ificant adu lts inte rrupted 
p resented negative emot ional symptoms even when some other  adu lt 
conti n ued to feed and care for them; on a s imple need-g ratif ication model 
any adu lt shou ld suff ice equal ly wel l .  Second he learned of the now­
famous experiments with animals conducted by Lorenz and Harlow which 
s u g g ested t h e  p resence and powe r of attac h m e nt p h e n o m e n a .  
Imp ressed with these observations Bowlby i ntroduced a n  "etholog ical " 
perspective to the theory of attachment. He pos ited a behavioral system 
in humans and other species which generates certain kinds of behavior  
i n  certa in  situat ions , " the outcome of  wh ich is an ongo ing re lationsh ip ,  
such as mai ntenance of  a specified d istance over a comparatively long 
per iod . " 1 2  Thus the attachment behavior  system which is i nherited 
p roduces behaviors with the goa/ of keeping proximity to certain preferred 
others; in h is  words ,  attachment behavior is goal -d i rected and goa/­
corrected. It operates by a kind of feedback process: if too g reat a 
d istance is perceived between the ind ividual and the attachment f igu re ,  
behavior  is e l ic ited to  restore proxim ity. 
Bowlby conce ived of the attach ment system as a k ind  of 
adaptat ion ,  and he recogn ized the re levance of cu ltu re and society to 
his work and vice versa. The system developed in  humans, he said ,  in 
response to the envi ronment in  which the h uman species evolved , what 
he cal led the " human envi ronment of adapted ness" in recogn it ion of the 
fact that i n  some ways this envi ronment was or  might be different from 
t h e  co nte m p o ra ry h u ma n  env i ro n m e nt . 1 3 I n  t h i s  ea r ly  h u ma n  
envi ronment there wou ld b e  a n  adaptive advantage for a n  i nfant t o  keep 
a care-g iver  in p roxi m i ty, so such  a behavio ra l  system a im ing  at 
attachment would be natural ly se lected .  An attachment system wou ld ,  
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i n  h is  account ,  contri bute to species surviva l .  
So with in  a few months of  b i rth humans begin to show s igns of  
attachment and to perform attachment behaviors. I n  i nteract ion wi th a 
s ign if icant care-g iver, an "attach ment f igure " ,  a re lat ionsh ip  develops 
which inc l udes not on ly instrumental care ( l i ke feed ing)  but an affect ive 
component; an "affect ional bond" is formed which for Bowlby meant "the 
att ract ion that one individual has for another individual. " 1 4  Attachment 
thus becomes a social re lationsh ip ,  ou r  f i rst, in which both adult and 
ch i l d  a re act ive part ic i pants (even if the ch i l d 's behavio r  is at f i rst 
"cybe rnet ica l ly  p ro g rammed " ) .  I n i t i a l l y  th ro u g h  re lat ive ly s i m p l e  
interactions l ike gazing and smi l ing and then through increas ingly complex 
interactions the two ind iv iduals form a bond which each ,  but especia l ly 
the weaker partner, acts forcefu l ly to p reserve . U lt imate ly th is bond 
evinces seven major  featu res :  specif ic ity, d u rat ion ,  engagement of 
emotion ,  ontogeny, learn ing ,  organ ization ,  and bio log ical funct ion . 1 5 
1 .  Specificity. The essence of attachment is a p reference for one 
ind ividual , or at most a few ind ividuals, over al l  others . 1 6 Even in  everyday 
s ituations the ch i ld 's p reference for one ind ividual (a mother  or father, 
ord inari ly) is easy to observe , as is the ch i ld 's alarm at separation from 
her/h im ;  no other  i ndiv idual w i l l  do as a substitute . Thus,  the specif icity 
of attachment is shown i n  "the associat ion of the attachment f ig u re with 
fee l i ngs of security" and in "the tendency . . .  to attempt to ward off o r  to 
end separat ion from an attachment f igu re . " 1 7 Attachment depends upon 
the ch i ld 's abi l ity to d iscrim inate among ind ividuals and to value one (or 
a few) above a l l  others .  
2 .  Duration. As a re lationsh ip ,  once an attachment is formed it tends 
to pers ist. Attachments are not ephemeral bonds; an attachment may, 
in fact , last a l ifetime or  a large portion of a l ifet ime.  Adolescents and 
adu lts also d isp lay attachment, sometimes to the same f ig u res to whom 
they were attached as ch i ld ren ,  sometimes to new ones.  Perhaps most 
interesti ng ly, as wi l l  be apparent below, an attachment seems to need 
no particu lar  re i nforcement to endure .  Attachment is actual ly d i ff icult to 
exti ngu ish  once fo rmed ,  and it " res ists ext i nction  even when there 
appears to be no positive gain from the re lat ionsh ip . " 1 8  It even seems to 
res ist ext i nct ion if there are negative consequences . Its end u rance , i n  
other  words ,  is not ent i rely " i nstrumental "  o r  " rat ional . "  
3.  Engagement o f  emotion. A s  w e  saw above , attachment  has 
instrumental funct ions (primari ly care and feed ing)  but is not ent i rely 
dependent upon or  determined by these; it is also a behavior  system 
with its own qual it ies, especial ly affective qual it ies . Maintain ing  such a 
bond is a sou rce of pleasure i n  itself ,  renewing it "a source of joy, " los ing  
it a source of "g rief" and fear. Attachment is a un ique k ind  of  affect, with 
its own conste l lat ion of posit ive and negative fee l ings ,  although it may 
be a l loyed with other affects to produce d ifferent k inds of affective states 
and social re lationsh ips .  I t  has sometimes been equated with love, and 
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at other  t imes i nvoked as an element in the love re lationsh ip .  
4.  Ontogeny. Attachment ,  although its sou rce is a behavioral  system 
which is  i nherited and insti nctive , has a genesis and a h istory, a course 
of development ,  for each ind iv idual .  This ontogeny of attachment is 
evidenced i n  several d ifferent ways . For one,  attachment is not the same 
at al l stages of l ife or even a l l  stages of i nfancy. A ch i ld normally goes 
through  a regu lar  set of phases: (a) from birth to about twelve weeks , 
o rientat ion toward humans without a preference for any particu lar person;  
(b) f rom about three to six months ,  c lear preference for one or  more 
d iscrim inated attachment f igures; (c) from s ix months through the second 
or  th i rd year, active efforts in  the form of movement and signals to maintain 
physical p roxim ity to the attachment f igu re ,  and (d) afte r the second or 
th i rd year, the formation of a "goal-corrected partnersh ip"  in which each 
party can anticipate and appreciate the act ions of the other, and the 
weaker party can tolerate separation with the understand ing that it is for 
some reason and some l im ited t ime. 1 9 Accord ing ly, attachment behavior 
beco mes more soph ist icated over t ime ,  and the attachment i tse l f  
becomes more i ntense up to a po int ,  after which it becomes g radual ly 
less common and less intense. 
Another  evidence for the ontogeny of attachment is the fact that 
it can "go wrong , "  that it can develop i n  d ifferent d i rect ions with d ifferent 
ki nds of affective outcomes. Several attachment theorists have reported 
that the attachments which i nfants form have different characteristics 
depend ing  on the natu re of the i nte ractions with the attachment f igu re .2o 
It is poss ib le i n  the end that if not enough qual ity i nteract ion occu rs at 
the c rit ical t ime for young humans,  no attachment may form at a l 1 . 2 1  
5 .  Learning. Clearly, then ,  although the  abi l ity and p ropensity to  form 
attach me nts is  "natu ra l , "  the p recise " natu re and the forms" of an 
attac h m e nt "d i ffe r in some meas u re accord i n g  to t he  part i c u l a r  
environment i n  which development takes place. "22 Attachment a s  a k ind 
of social re lationsh ip is learned and constructed i n  i nteract ion ,  and the 
qua l i ty of the i nte ract ion  wi l l  shape the q ua l ity of the attach ment  
re lat ionsh ip .  Ne ither the fact nor the form of  attachment for  an ind iv idual 
is  a "g iven . "  However, the general sense i n  attachment theory is  that 
the i nd iv idua l  tr ies val iantly to attach to someone (j ust as Lorenz's 
duck l ings t ry val iantly to " imprint" on someth ing)  and to get that f igure to 
respond  and rec iprocate, even "despite repeated pun ishment" or  other 
rebuke .  However under such c i rcumstances the  attachment may be 
anemic or deformed by other contradictory affect. 
6. and 7. Organization and Biological Function. I have combined these 
two featu res because of their systematic relat ion.  As we have seen ,  
attachment emanates from an inherited behavior  system which operates 
toward a goal through feedback; Bowlby called it cybernetic. It is activated 
by certa in  env i ron mental  (soc ia l )  cond it ions ,  i nc l ud i ng  separat ion , 
"st rangeness ,  hunge r, fat i gue ,  and anyth i n g  f r ig hten i n g .  "23 O nce 
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activated it d raws upon a repertoi re of "attachment behaviors , "  accord ing  
to  the developmental stage of  the individual ,  the  goal o f  which is to  achieve 
and maintain proxim ity to another preferred i nd ividual . Upon reach ing 
the goal , the ind ividual ceases to  exh ib it attachment behavior and can 
d i rect attention to other matters , the most famous of which are exploration 
and play. 
S ign if icant ly, th is  same o rgan izat iona l  pattern -- activat ion ,  
behavior, te rmination ,  and emotional "freedom" - - is observed i n  many 
other  species , i nc lud ing  Harlow's monkeys , although of cou rse the 
particular activat ing cond it ions and attachment behaviors are species­
specif ic. However, Bowlby found the attachment phenomenon to be 
common enough and s im i lar enough to suggest a bio log ical funct ion fo r 
it :  i nd ividual p rotect ion and species preservation . Attachment is an 
evo lut ionari ly-developed,  natura l ly-selected adaptat ion "the u lt i mate 
outcome for which . . .  is neither more nor  less than species surviva l . "24 
Social Identification Theory 
Having demonstrated that a psycholog ical theory may shed l ight 
on  the attach ment  wh ich  many ana lysts be l i eve u n d e rl i es  soc ia l  
phenomena l i ke ethn ic ity, we must admit that Bowlby's theory does not 
provide a complete theory of ethn ic attachment.  The attachment which 
Bowlby describes , for example, is juven i le ,  dyad ic, and concrete , whereas 
the ethn ic attachment is adu lt ,  g roup- or commun ity- or even nat ion­
focused , and symbol ic ,  that is ,  concerned at once with 1 )  symbols l i ke 
f lags, songs,  and i ns ign ia ,  2) symbol ical ly s ign ificant characte ristics l i ke 
sk in color, h istory, o r  customs,  and 3) people whom we do not and 
probably never wi l l  know. A truly inc lus ive theory of attachment shou ld 
be ab le  to encompass such psychocu ltu ra l  phenomena wit h i n  a 
perspective which is both affective and cogn itive . 
Social identif icat ion theory, henceforth referred to as S IT, which 
orig inated from Henri Tajfe l 's work on the social -psycholog ical processes 
of g roup formation ,  specif ical ly addresses the issue of g roup identit ies 
and g roup p references . Tajfel beg ins by not ing that "g roup" d ist inctions 
may exist whether or  not relevant g roups are actual ly i n  social contact 
and whether or not "c lear-cut phys ical or behavioral  cues . . .  ex ist to 
fac i l itate d iscrimination . "25 He therefo re i nvest igated the p rocesses of 
g roup format ion and g roup awareness with what he cal led "m in imal 
g roup"  exper iments, which entai led assign ing subjects to g roups based 
on an arbitra ry category or characteristic (such as " red" and "b lue" ) .  
Subjects were then asked to make choices o r  judgments on some task 
which concerned the g roup;  however, the other members of the g roup ,  if 
there actual ly were any (often the "g roup" was pure ly fictional)  were 
never seen .  With no more basis than th is ,  subjects evi nced a tendency 
to j udge in p reference of the i r  supposed g roup-fe l lows , suggesting  the 
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existence and operat ion  of some sort of " g roup  sense"  and g roup  
attachment .  
The conclus ion d rawn by S IT is that the "mere percept ion of 
common category membersh ip  may be . . .  necessary and suff ic ient fo r 
g roup  format ion . "26 Social categorizat ion itself ,  and even more so 
situations and activities (even weak ones, l i ke the "m in imal  g roup "  
s i tuat ion)  which d i rect or  compel the  ind ividual to  th i nk  and  behave in  
terms of  social categories,  lead first to  identification with some category 
and second to attachment to i t .  G roup membersh ip  i n  th is  v iew is 
"cogn it ive" o r  "perceptual"  f i rst and affective second:  it is  an emotional 
bond to a perceived social category and to membersh ip i n  said category. 
I n  fact , the "personal " ,  that is ,  person-to-person,  attachment (beari ng i n  
m ind that S IT does not specifical ly use  the  term attachment) is construed 
as less fundamental than the person-to-category attachment :  "We may 
not, afte r al l ,  tend to join people we l i ke as much as l i ke people we 
perceive ou rselves joined to . "27 In a real way the attachment to the 
category rather than to specif ic people makes the g roup .  
The process of  social identification as understood in  S IT i nvolves 
a th ree part sequence of social categorization , social ident ity, and social 
comparison .  Social categories exist in virtually al l  human social situations 
and certa in ly i n  a l l  societies . These categories may be racia l ,  ethn ic ,  
loca l ,  o r  any number of  others ;  in  a certain sense they are "g iven"  i n  the 
sense of social facts "exist ing p rior to the interact ion" but not necessari ly 
apriori; rather, they are the constructs of earl ier  interact ional patte rns 
and outcomes. At any rate , in i nte ract ion ind ividuals are exposed to the 
catego ries and the i r  re levance for behavior ;  ind iv iduals learn which 
category "they are"  and how that fact constrains the i r  choices and the 
expectat ions which others have of  them. 
U n d e r  n o rm a l  c i rc u m st a n c e s  expe r i e n c e  w i t h  s o c i a l  
categorizat ion leads ind ividuals t o  identify with the category and with 
the othe rs who share categoria l  membersh ip .  Recogn it ion of and 
identif icat ion with a social category (such as an ethnic or  racial  category) 
e nte rs i nto the ind iv idual 's "self-concept , "  the "hypothetical cog n it ive 
struct u re "  wh ich mediates between the ind iv idual 's  pe rsonal ity and 
behavior  and the external social world .  I n  particu lar, social categorizat ion 
and perceived membersh ip  i n  a category lead to the format ion of an 
individual 's "social  identity, " def ined as "that part of an ind ividual 's self­
concept which derives from his knowledge of his membersh ip  of a social 
g roup (or g roups) together with the value and emotional s ign ificance 
attached to that membersh ip . "28 The ind ividual now "th i nks l i ke" and 
"behaves l i ke"  a member of the category or, now, group. 
The f inal  step i n  the sequence is social comparison .  This has 
two d ifferent aspects , one objective or  "social ly g iven" and the other  
subjective . On the objective s ide society comes complete not on ly with 
social categories but with social evaluations of those categories a system 
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of re lat ive p rest ige and powe r as we l l  as part icu lar  i mages and  
stereotypes, which enter into and  affect the  interactional possib i l it ies 
and the social identities of members .  The system of groups and of social 
evaluat ions of those g roups constitutes the environment, the "frame of 
refe rence , "  for social comparison and for the construction of positive or 
negative social identit ies which incorporate these evaluations .  The 
subjective aspect is the individual 's need for a positive social identity 
(fo r what we might cal l self-esteem) which entai ls both a sharp d istinction 
from other g roups and categories and a positive evaluation of one's own 
group on some valued criteria. Thus, it is in  the interest of a g roup of this 
kind to emphasize or  maximize the d ifferences between itself and other 
g roups in  the social f ie ld and to f ind value in  one or  more of its own 
g roup characteristics ; th is also helps to account for the common need to 
denig rate or d iscriminate against other groups. In fact, on th is basis S IT 
offers its "categorization law" : "as category memberships become sal ient, 
there wi l l  be a tendency to exaggerate the d i fferences on c rite r ial 
d i mensions between individuals fal l ing i nto disti nct categories , and to 
min imize those difference with in  each of these categories. "29 
I t  is c ri t ica l  to note that the  theoret ical  seq ue nce ,  soc ia l  
categorization-social identity-social comparison,  and the entire social 
identification phenomenon described in SIT, while seemingly natural and 
easi ly accompl ished, is qu ite expl icitly learned. People are not born 
with a social identity, nor is it accurate to say that they acqu i re such an 
identity independent of social interaction by some process of cu ltural  or 
sp i ritual osmosis .  I n  fact the whole point of S IT is that people learn 
social identities , make social judgments, and exhibit social behavior as 
a resu lt of participation in categorial ly-organized social interactions in  
situations in which social categories are a real and sal ient element of 
the cogn itive and behavioral environment. 
Tajfel specifical ly discusses how the learned aspect of social 
identity and g roup membersh ip helps to account for the varying strength 
and even varying existence of g roup attachment and group oriented 
behavior for d ifferent ind ividuals at different times . Most basically the 
p resence of categories and re lative eva luat ions of them does not 
necessari ly compel the individual to recognize them nor to identify with 
them. At the same t ime some social situations al low or force ind ividuals 
to perceive categorical d ifferences and group identifications more than 
others and to consider those differences and identifications in  determining 
thei r  own identity and subsequent behavior. It  is  enti rely possible that 
the perception of and identification with category and g roup may initially 
be absent or weak for any g iven individual ,  but if these situations are 
sufficiently frequent and serious then perception and identification may 
develop and strengthen.  Tajfel says it best when he writes: ·Social 
situations which wi l l  force the ind ividuals involved to act in terms of their 
g roup membership wil l also enhance for them some g roup identifications 
1 49 
Ethnic Studies Review Vol. 19, No. 2&3 
which had previously not been very significant to them, or perhaps even 
create or bring to l ife group memberships which were previously on ly 
dormant or potential . "3o 
Correspondingly, once a categorical ly-based social identity is 
constructed in the individual, it functions as a lens through which to judge 
social situations and interactions and by which to organize behavior, as 
evidenced by the original minimal-g roup experiments . Turner writes that 
social identity "monitors and construes social st imu l i , "31 f ind ing or even 
imputing "group mean ing" in social situations. Social c ircumstances are 
therefore interpreted in terms of social categories and the re ig n ing  
evaluat ions of  them making i t  possible to  " read i nto" a situation or  
interaction a g roup significance. Furthermore, social identity also serves 
as a source of individual behavior, behavior which is also conducted i n  
terms of  perceived g roup categories , comparisons ,  and i nterests . 
U lt imately, S IT posits that "social identity is the cognitive mechanism 
which makes group behavior possible. "32 Then, in more or less extensive 
fashion for various individuals at various times, social identities and, 
therefore, social categories as "social facts" can structure the perception, 
course, and outcome of social interaction .  Social identity as premised 
on social categories and categorical ly-based group formation is thus an 
indefin itely elastic phenomenon which can expand and contract with 
changing social c ircumstances and changing i nterpretations of those 
c i rcumstances . 
CONCLUSION 
As we have seen,  both attachment theory and social identification 
theory g ive us a view of affective bonds to specific others which are 
plastiC and social ly constructed or plastiC because they are social ly 
constructed .  Attachment, i n  the f i rst case p rimari ly an emot iona l  
p h e no m e n o n  and  i n  the  seco nd  case p r i mar i l y  a c o g n i t ive or  
identificational one ,  is  seen in  both theories as "natu ral" or  " i nstinctive , "  
but the actual attachments which form are unpredictable,  uncertain ,  and 
flexible: The two characteristics of plasticity and social construction are 
crucial to any theoretical exposition of ethnic attachment, which though 
often powerfu l ,  pervasive, and persistent is not always equal ly so and 
must be a product of social interaction if i t  to be a usefu l social concept. 
Thus a social-psychological conception of attachment has the 
potential to meet the "primordial challenge" of ethnicity for social theory, 
especially in  regard to its apparent g iven ness, strength ,  and i rrational ity. 
If an attachment phenomenon such as the one described in the theories 
above underl ies ethnicity, then ethnicity is not in fact a resu lt of mere 
" immediate contigu ity and kin connections" but is an artifact of specific 
and analyzable social experiences and psychological tendencies .  
Contiguity or k in connection provide the social opportunities to form 
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attachments and identities by providing contexts of social interaction ,  
but  those simple "primordials" are not coercive of  either, not i n  fact nor  in  
fo rm . 
F i rst of a l l ,  though the propensity to form attachments is natural 
in humans , attachment is seen in both theories above as learned and 
situational .  Certain specific i nteractions with specific others actualize 
the potential attachment and g ive it its particular characteristics for the 
individual in  question .  Though " natura l "  in principle for humans as a 
species, each actual attachment is specific to the i ndividual and, more 
importantly, to the situations i n  which the ind ividual experiences others 
and the wider social world .  Attachment is "h istorical " or "biographical" i n  
the sense of  its being the product of  the encounters between the person 
and his or her social environment. This real ization actual ly opens up an 
area of research fo r ethnicity studies, namely the "social ization" of ethnic 
identities and attachments . 
Second ,  attachment br idges the theoret ical gap between 
primordial ism and c i rcumstantial ism by combining affect and interest. 
Attachment, whether infanti le or identificational, is instrumental in a sense; 
it is born of certain interests and continues to serve certain interests 
after fo rmation .  However, the affective character of the attachment is 
not total ly defined nor l imited by those i nterests , such that it can appear 
that the affect and the i nterest are independent or even contradictory for 
example, that the affect is i r rational and perhaps counterproductive in 
re lat ion to actual i nte rests or that the interest is on ly a secondary 
consideration after the affect. But Bowlby notes that attachment arises 
out of an interest in safety and security and tends to endure once formed, 
regard less of subsequent experiences , even ones which might seem to 
extinguish it. Tajfel 's appeal to social identity, on the other hand, suggests 
that the attachment becomes an i ntegral aspect of the self emerging 
from an interest to know and value oneself but then determining in  large 
part how interests are perceived and how behavior in  pursuit of interests 
is conducted in the future. 
Thus, attachment has a "function"  which u ltimately tu rns on the 
preservation or  perpetuation or even advancement of the "group." Bowlby 
says so specifical ly, and SIT shows that social ly-identified individuals 
tend to act in  favor of the group. In  a sense the group might be conceived 
not as a Darwin ian popu lation whose fitness is increased by attachment 
phenomena but as a symbol ic popu lation marked and isolated by 
symbol ic boundaries (which may nevertheless become real in such forms 
as endogamy ru les or neighborhoods or even states) . As Anderson so 
rightly noted, such groups are " imagined commun ities· which emerge 
through boundary processes which are , i n  DeVos' words, "basical ly 
psycho log ica l  i n  nat u re ,  not terr i tori a l . "33 Th is  is why, as S I T  
acknowledges i n  particular, there i s  no  real correlation between the 
amount of "cu ltu ral" d ifference between categories or  groups and the 
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i ntensity of the identity and boundary d isti nctions made by members . 
At the same time this attachment does not function to the same 
extent for al l ind ividuals at a l l  t imes. Both theories above ag ree that the 
phenomenon may u ltimately be present or absent, strong or weak, and 
active or  dormant in  any actual case. Certain specific situational triggers 
may also activate attachment-oriented or identity-oriented responses or 
enhance the personal salience of these qual ities for the individual , making 
such responses more l ikely in  the future. Furthermore ,  the elastic ity of 
its affective and cognitive qual ities makes it poss ible for it to expand and 
contract, i ntenSify and subside, as circumstances warrant. New terms 
or  s ituations may become imbued with group s ign ificance , and the very 
boundaries and qual ities of the category or g roup may sh ift over t ime.  
I n  the end ethnicity is not just attachment and noth ing else;  it is 
one of the many h uman aff i l iat ions based on attachment .  Var ious 
scholars have noted that ethn icity exh ibits mult iple aspects of which the 
affective t ie or  bond is one. However, to the extent that an attachment is 
imp l icated i n  the psychosocial al loy which is ethn ic ity, the theories 
presented above have much to offer in expl icati ng one important facet 
of the phenomenon. Even more ,  each theory in its way al lows fo r such 
an a l loy. Attachment theorists after Bowlby have commented on the 
tendency for attachment to enter into mixtures of psychological processes, 
result ing in  various affective states such as adu lt love and perhaps even 
national ism. S IT very expl icitly s ituates g roup identity and preference 
with i n  a f ie ld  of socia l  categories , soc ia l  eva luat io n s ,  and soc ia l  
interactions which opens the social identification process to  symbol ic  
and pol itical forces . The particular kinds of  categories , g roups ,  and 
markers which compose ethn ic attachment and eth n ic identity w i l l  
d istinguish i t  from other re lationships and identities which also conta in  
an attach ment at  their  heart. However, a psychosocia l ly articu late 
conception of the attachment underlying ethn icity retu rns this critical ly 
important modern phenomenon to the fold of social ly-constructed cu ltural 
processes. 
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